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The Metaphysics of Beauty is a collection of Nick Zangwill's published essays 
on aesthetics. Some are revised, and there are three new appendices and one 
previously unpublished essay. The book touches on an impressive range of 
topics in analytic aesthetics: aesthetic properties, the intentional fallacy, 
architecture, gender issues, the aesthetics of nature, the sociology of taste, 
and more. Throughout, Zangwill confronts the best of philosophical aesthet-
ics in an engaging and honest style. When he is uneasy with his own views 
he says so, and he is not above occasionally admitting that his opponents are 
right. That said, Zangwill spends most of the book arguing iconoclastically 
and inventively against philosophical orthodoxy. 
In Part One, Zangwill argues that beauty has a 'preeminent place' in 
aesthetics (2). Specifically, he rejects the tendency, apparent in Austin, 
Goodman and others, to dismiss verdictive aesthetic judgments ('this vase is 
beautiful') in favour of'substantive' ones ('this vase is dainty'). This is tricky. 
For on one hand, Zangwill sensibly maintains that beauty must be 'tied' to 
substantive properties somehow, because 'something which is beautiful 
cannot be barely beautiful. It must be beautiful because it has various 
substantive properties' (19). Further, if verdictive properties are aesthetic 
properties, they must have some 'close link' to substantive aesthetic proper-
ties that '.justifies grouping them together in one category' (4). On the other 
hand, however, beauty cannot be tied too tightly to these properties, lest the 
distinction between them be lost and verdictive judgements become merely 
abbreviated substantive judgements. 
Zangwill deftly steers a middle course. He sees verdictive properties as 
tied to substantive ones in supervening on them, and by being 'essentially 
linked' to them. Not only does the elegance of a vase, in conjunction with its 
grace and delicacy, determine, or necessitate, that it is beautiful; it is also 
'part of what it is to be elegant to be beautiful' (35). This close metaphysical 
connection, however, is offset by the 'epistemic autonomy' of verdictive 
properties (21). Although substantive properties determine verdictive ones, 
one can never argue or reason from the former to the latter. Beauty must be 
grasped directly by a faculty of taste. Substantive judgments are 'more like 
rationalizations, in the pejorative sense, than reasons' (40), merely describ-
ing 'the way that a thing achieves aesthetic merit' (34). 
In Part Two, Zangwill sets out to rehabilitate that 'much despised doc-
trine', Formalism. He dissociates himself from the aesthetician's favourite 
punching bag, Clive Bell's theory of Formalism, advocating instead 'moderate 
formalism': (1) many or all works of art have some formal properties, (2) some 
works of art (nonrepresentational and noncontextual works) have only for-
mal properties, and (3) all aesthetic properties depend, at least partly, on 
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sensory qualities. To turn aside counterexamples, Zangwill employs several 
strategies: conceding that some aesthetic properties are not formal, showing 
that knowledge supposedly required for appreciating an artwork is actually 
irrelevant to its aesthetic qualities, and demonstrating that supposedly 
non-formal aesthetic qualities are not really aesthetic. He criticizes, at 
length, Walton's 'guernica' argument, an influential source of anti-formalist 
sentiment. His case is rounded out by discussion of the appreciation of 
artworks, natural objects and abstract entities, such as theories and proofs. 
In many cases, Zangwill shows that moderate formalism does justice to our 
aesthetic experience; where it appears not to, he explains away its apparent 
implausibility. 
Throughout, Zangwill construes the formal/non-formal distinction 
roughly on the lines ofKant's distinction between free and dependent beauty. 
Something that has non-formal aesthetic properties is dependently beautiful, 
or beautiful 'as a thing with a certain function' (61). Formal aesthetic 
properties are free beauties that 'do not depend on the fact that the thing has 
some non-aesthetic function ' (61). This way of construing non-formal beauty 
is one of the weaker points of the book, and it sometimes cripples Zangwill's 
analyses. This is perhaps most apparent in his discussion of nature, where 
it leads him to claim that inorganic natural objects, having no 'evolutionary 
function', must possess only formal qualities. Even apart from its initial 
implausibility, this is problematic. 
What Zangwill has in mind, presumably, is the notion of a 'selected 
function': that effect of an item or trait that explains the selective success 
(and hence survival) of ancestral organisms with that item or trait. Since 
inorganic natural objects do not undergo natural selection, these functions 
are found only in organic nature. However, many paradigm cases of depend-
ent natural beauty in organic nature are not beauties involving selected 
functions. For instance, in On The Origin of Species Darwin noted that while 
'the sutures in the skulls of young mammals have been advanced as a 
beautiful adaptation for aiding parturition', in fact these sutures did not arise 
because of their capacity to aid in birthing. Instead, 'this structure has arisen 
from the laws of growth, and has been taken advantage ofin the parturition 
of the higher animals'. The example is somewhat esoteric, but the general 
point is that biological organs and traits carry out many important tasks 
besides the ones for whkh they have been selected, and may have dependent 
beauty in Jjght of performing these. 
Therefore dependent/non-formal beauty cannot be accounted for in terms 
of selected functions. This puts pressure on Zangwill to adopt a wider sense 
of 'function', according to which a history involving selective success is not 
essential for having a function. However, on such accounts (e.g., Cummins's) 
functions are not restricted to organic items that undergo natural selection. 
So if dependent/non-formal beauty is to be construed in terms of functions 
then inorganic nature should possess such beauties too. In fact, however, the 
whole notion that all non-formal beauty can be crammed into a function-
based framework is dubious. This is why sophisticated non-formal ap-
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proaches to aesthetic appreciation (e.g., Walton's) tend to embrace a plural-
ism about the ways in which cognitive factors can enter into aesthetic 
experience. 
Part Three of the book advances into metaphysical matters surrounding 
the ontology of aesthetic properties. Zangwill offers an interesting interpre-
tation of Hume's non-cognitivist anti-realism about aesthetic qualities, but 
ultimately rejects Hume's account. He also criticizes arguments for anti-re-
alism that play on the metaphorical nature of aesthetic language. Despite 
opposing these strands of anti-realist thought, however, he also eschews 
aesthetic realism in its stronger forms, in which aesthetic properties are 
mind-independent. Zangwill himself opts for the more traditional view that 
aesthetic properties, though real, are mind-dependent in an important sense. 
This stance is directly related to his formalist commitment to a dependence 
of aesthetic properties on sensory ones. Since sensory qualities are mind-de-
pendent, and 'aesthetic properties inherit the metaphysical status of sensory 
properties, whatever it may be' (200), aesthetic properties are mind-depend-
ent. 
The above gloss fails to do justice to the thoroughness, erudition and 
insight that Zangwill brings to each of the issues he tackles. The book ends 
with a useful chapter in which Zangwill compares his views with other 
writers and mounts a rousing charge against sociological approaches to the 
aesthetic, which he sees as attacking the entire aesthetic tradition. His 
specific critiques of these approaches aside, The Metaphysics of Beauty itself, 
as a stimulating and spirited tour through many of the central issues of 
contemporary aesthetics, is clear testament to the vibrancy of that tradition. 
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